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Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China

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  • Mu, Ren
  • Zhang, Xiaobo

Abstract

Do elected leaders in an authoritarian regime have any real power? Does grassroots democracy in a one-party state entail parochial problems? Making use of primary survey data covering two election cycles in a mountainous area of China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages (NVs), we find that elected village heads favor their home NVs in resource allocations, especially when these NVs have a large population. In contrast, the home NVs of appointed Communist Party secretaries do not receive disproportionately more resources, on average. This pattern of resource allocation is compatible with the interest of village heads and suggests that as elected leaders, village heads have some true power in resource distribution.

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  • Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2014. "Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 17-27.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:17-27
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.009
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    Cited by:

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    2. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Hodler, Roland & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul A. & Tierney, Michael J., 2019. "African leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 44-71.
    3. Dreher, Axel & Hodler, Roland & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul & Tierney, Michael, 2015. "Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China's Foreign Assistance," CEPR Discussion Papers 10704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Lai, Weizheng, 2024. "The effect of education on voter turnout in China's rural elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 230-247.
    5. Kahsay, Goytom Abraha & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2020. "Leader turnover and forest management outcomes: Micro-level evidence from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    6. Corvalan, Alejandro & Cox, Paulo & Osorio, Rodrigo, 2018. "Indirect political budget cycles: Evidence from Chilean municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Véronique Gille, 2016. "Application for social programs: the role of local politics and caste networks in affirmative action in India," Working Papers DT/2016/13, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    8. Székely-Doby, András, 2014. "A kínai reformfolyamat politikai gazdaságtani logikája [The politico-economic logic of the Chinese reform process]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1397-1418.
    9. Francis Osei-Tutu & Laurent Weill, 2024. "Regional favoritism in access to credit," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 293-321, July.
    10. Roland Cheo & Kainan Huang & Jingping Li, 2023. "Group cooperation of village officials in Chinese rural resettlement: A lab in the field," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 388-407, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Allocations of public goods; Favoritism; Election; Appointed leader; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P36 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty

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