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Land reform, emerging grassroots democracy and political trust in China

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Listed:
  • Chen, Xing
  • Xu, Jintao
  • Yi, Yuanyuan
  • Zhuge, Andong

Abstract

This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers’ political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Analyzing a two-period household survey dataset, we find that in China’s recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, which has devolved the tenure rights of the village collective-owned forestland to households, democratic decision-making increases trust for town and county cadres. The impact on trust towards village cadres is significant only when democracy involves all villagers in a village. We show two mechanisms that improve villagers’ trust: the “privatization” effect, where democratic decision-making leads to more land devolved to villagers, and the “conflict-resolving” effect, where improved information and cohesion by mass participation helps resolve inter-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party or village committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Xing & Xu, Jintao & Yi, Yuanyuan & Zhuge, Andong, 2025. "Land reform, emerging grassroots democracy and political trust in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:185:y:2025:i:c:s0305750x24002626
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106792
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political trust; Grassroots democracy; Land reform; Collective Forest Tenure Reform; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P25 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions

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