Gender, caste, and public goods provision in Indian village governments:
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Cited by:
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2ck6as9uec9, Sciences Po.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh, 2016. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," CEPR Discussion Papers 11126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Post-Print hal-03391952, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Roiser, Anh N. Tran & Tran, Anh N., 2016. "One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2016. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," CEP Discussion Papers dp1409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/sj22pruud8a, Sciences Po.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391952, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications 13, Sciences Po.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh N., 2017. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chen, Shuo & Fan, Xinyu, 2021. "Warcraft: The legitimacy building of usurpers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 409-431.
- Li, Houjian & Cao, Andi & Twumasi, Martinson Ankrah & Zhang, Hongzhen & Zhong, Shunbin & Guo, Lili, 2023. "Do female cadres improve clean energy accessibility in villages? Evidence from rural China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh N., 2017. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03470572, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Post-Print hal-03391952, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391952, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Roiser, Anh N. Tran & Tran, Anh N., 2016. "One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2016. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," CEP Discussion Papers dp1409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2011.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy,"
Working Papers
18-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2012. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy," Working Papers 07-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- Nagarajan, Hari K. & Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2011. "Can political reservations affect political equilibria in the long-term? Evidence from local elections in rural India," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 59, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2014. "Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 17-27.
- repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2014.
"Accountability of local and state governments in India: an overview of recent research,"
Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(1), pages 12-41, April.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2015. "Accountability of Local and State Governments in India: An Overview of Recent Research," Working Papers id:6805, eSocialSciences.
- Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin & Hari K. Nagarajan & Fang Xia, 2015.
"Does Female Reservation Affect Long-Term Political Outcomes? Evidence from Rural India,"
Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 32-49, January.
- Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Nagarajan, Hari K. & Fang, Xia, 2011. "Does female reservation affect long-term political outcomes ? Evidence from rural India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5708, The World Bank.
- Ulrike Müller, 2012. "Pro-poor Service Delivery and Social Identity," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-055, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2011. "The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China," IFPRI discussion papers 1061, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-55 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywords
Local governance; public goods provision; Gender; Caste;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CWA-2008-11-04 (Central and Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2008-11-04 (Development)
- NEP-PBE-2008-11-04 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-11-04 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2008-11-04 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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