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Rural tax reform and the extractive capacity of local state in China

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  • LIU, Mingxing
  • XU, Zhigang
  • SU, Fubing
  • TAO, Ran

Abstract

China's fiscal arrangement in the 1980s has preserved local governments' incentive but the 1994 fiscal reform recentralized revenues. Since then, farmers' tax burdens have risen steeply and become a major challenge to the state legitimacy. How to account for the huge regional variation? Why were some localities able to tax more heavily than others? Based on a national survey of village governance in China, we examine farmers' burdens empirically and identify political and social factors that explain the local governments' ability to tax farmers. This paper suggests that developments since the 1990s have shown that it overstates local discretionary power and does not pay enough attention to societal forces in understanding local public finance.

Suggested Citation

  • LIU, Mingxing & XU, Zhigang & SU, Fubing & TAO, Ran, 2012. "Rural tax reform and the extractive capacity of local state in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 190-203.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:23:y:2012:i:1:p:190-203
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2011.10.002
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    Cited by:

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    3. Changjun Liao & Shengquan Wang, 2021. "The Political Economy of the Differential Regional Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence From China," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 59(4), pages 351-370, December.
    4. Wenting Wang & Longbao Wei, 2021. "Impacts of agricultural price support policy on price variability and welfare: Evidence from China's soybean market," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 52(1), pages 3-17, January.
    5. Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2014. "Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 17-27.
    6. Cheng, Hua & Gawande, Kishore & Qi, Shusen, 2022. "State capacity, economic output, and public goods in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    7. Kaidong Feng & Ziying Jiang, 2021. "State Capacity and Innovation Policy Performance: A Comparative Study on Two Types of Innovation Projects in China," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 38(4), pages 427-453, July.
    8. Wang, Can & Deng, Mengzhi & Deng, Junfeng, 2020. "Factor reallocation and structural transformation implications of grain subsidies in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    9. Zhongen Niu & Huimin Yan & Fang Liu, 2020. "Decreasing Cropping Intensity Dominated the Negative Trend of Cropland Productivity in Southern China in 2000–2015," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-14, December.
    10. Lin, Wensheng & Huang, Jikun, 2021. "Impacts of agricultural incentive policies on land rental prices: New evidence from China," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central–local relations; Local public finance; Farmers' burdens; Rural Tax reform; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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