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Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games

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  • Li, Ya
  • Chen, Shanxiong
  • Niu, Ben

Abstract

Prisoner’s dilemma (shortly, PD) games are studied on a square lattice, in which reward mechanisms are considered to stimulate cooperation. It is known to all that results vary with different reward methods. The tax mechanism, an effective tool to adjust the economy, inspires a reward approach where each player should pay corresponding taxes according to their payoff ranks to gather public funds, which is utilized to reward cooperators. There are three main reward levels: high intensity, middle intensity and low intensity. When total public funds keep relatively stable, the reward coverage is determined by the reward intensity. In other words, high intensity of reward is accompanied with narrow range and low intensity accompanies with wide range. Through the proposed model, whether the new reward mechanism can stimulate cooperation and what reward level is the optimum choice could be studied. Simulations reveal that this new mechanism is of great benefit to cooperation and it is noteworthy that low reward intensity with wide coverage has the biggest impact on cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Ya & Chen, Shanxiong & Niu, Ben, 2018. "Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 38-45.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:114:y:2018:i:c:p:38-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2018.07.002
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    3. Alfaro, Gaspar & Sanjuan, Miguel A.F., 2022. "Time-dependent effects hinder cooperation on the public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    4. Zhenghong Wu & Huan Huang & Qinghu Liao, 2021. "The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(9), pages 1-17, September.
    5. Zhang, Xiaoyang & Chen, Tong & Chen, Qiao & Li, Xueya, 2020. "Increasing pool funds in public goods: The effects of deposit-based delayed rewards," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    6. Zhang, Lulu & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2022. "The influence of donation behavior on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    7. Pu, Jia & Jia, Tao & Li, Ya, 2019. "Effects of time cost on the evolution of cooperation in snowdrift game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 146-151.
    8. Lu, Shounan & Dai, Jianhua & Zhu, Ge & Guo, Li, 2023. "Investigating the effectiveness of interaction-efficiency-driven strategy updating under progressive-interaction for the evolution of the prisoner's dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    9. Fu, Xiao & Liu, Xuesong & Hu, Yuhan & Huang, Shaoxu, 2023. "Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 455(C).
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    11. Bi, Yan & Yang, Hui, 2023. "Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 444(C).

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