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An efficient, open-bid procurement auction for small-scale electricity markets

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  • Lange, Sebastian
  • Sokolowski, Peter
  • Yu, Xinghuo

Abstract

Despite early calls to investigate the application of Vickrey auctions in electricity markets, academic literature still provides little insight into the matter. Similarly, despite general auction-theoretic literature discussing various advantages of employing revealed rather than sealed bidding procedures, publications on electricity market auctions rarely even mention differences between these opposing features. This paper marries these neglected features into a new auction model for electricity markets. We propose a novel open-bid, descending-clock auction capable of handling inter-bidder dependencies such as thermal line limits. A novel set of termination criteria ensures that our proposed auction facing markets with power balance and generator capacity constraints and thermal line limits, preserves truthful bidding as a dominant strategy, which, if employed by all bidders, allocates supply efficiently constituting an ex-post perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, we discuss known disadvantages of Vickrey–Clarke–Groves type auctions in the context of our proposed auction applied in electricity markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Lange, Sebastian & Sokolowski, Peter & Yu, Xinghuo, 2022. "An efficient, open-bid procurement auction for small-scale electricity markets," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 314(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:314:y:2022:i:c:s0306261922003002
    DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.118867
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aguado, José A. & Paredes, Ángel, 2023. "Coordinated and decentralized trading of flexibility products in Inter-DSO Local Electricity Markets via ADMM," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 337(C).

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