Protecting the winner : Second-price versus oral auctions
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- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. & Kahn, C.M., 1990. "Protecting the Wnner: Second-price Versus Oral Auctions," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-8, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Erlanson, Albin, 2011. "The Multi-item Bisection Auction," Working Papers 2011:31, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012.
"System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
10acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012. "System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 12acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Michael H. Rothkopf, 2007. "Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 191-197, April.
- Albin Erlanson, 2014. "The Duo-Item Bisection Auction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, January.
- Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012.
"Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.
- Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2009. "Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Elena Grigorieva & P. Herings & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2007.
"The private value single item bisection auction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, January.
- Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Vermeulen, A.J. & Müller, R.J., 2002. "The private value single item bisection auction," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Wynne P. Jones, 2012. "System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items," Papers of Peter Cramton 11acjam, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006.
"Corruption and auctions,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 2001. "Corruption and auctions," Microeconomics 0105002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lange, Sebastian & Sokolowski, Peter & Yu, Xinghuo, 2022. "An efficient, open-bid procurement auction for small-scale electricity markets," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 314(C).
- Andersson, Tommy & Erlanson, Albin, 2013.
"Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 116-129.
- Andersson, Tommy & Erlanson, Albin, 2012. "Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions," Working Papers 2012:17, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2013.
- Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
- Grigorieva,Elena & Herings,Jean-Jacques & Müller,Rudolf & Vermeulen,Dries, 2004. "The communication complexity of private value single item auctions," Research Memorandum 052, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2018.
"Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-59.
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2015. "Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions," Working Papers 2015:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 11 Oct 2017.
- Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
- Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2629-2661, November.
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