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Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus and the Process of Innovation

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  • Dewatripont, Mathias
  • Stein, Jeremy
  • Aghion, Philippe

Abstract

We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research, we emphasize control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.

Suggested Citation

  • Dewatripont, Mathias & Stein, Jeremy & Aghion, Philippe, 2007. "Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus and the Process of Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6234
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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