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Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections

Author

Listed:
  • Jamie L. Carson

    (University of Georgia)

  • Ryan D. Williamson

    (American Political Science Association)

Abstract

In examining the factors that contribute to electoral success in congressional elections, legislative scholars often consider the actions of elected representatives; however, other research suggests that one must consider what challengers are (or are not) doing as well. For instance, inexperience and poor funding can significantly inhibit challenger success. We expand this list of potential shortcomings by arguing that ideological congruence with a constituency may be another factor in explaining challenger defeat. Using ideology measures derived from campaign contributions, we find that unsuccessful challengers in the U.S. House are generally more extreme than those who win, but ideological extremity is not a disadvantage to those seeking to represent an extreme constituency. More importantly, our existing political institutions may actually serve to mitigate the already high levels of partisan polarization in Congress.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamie L. Carson & Ryan D. Williamson, 2018. "Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 175-192, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:176:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0492-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0492-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Douglas D. Roscoe & Shannon Jenkins, 2021. "Amateur hour: The dominance of purposive benefits among local political party chairs," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1602-1614, July.

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