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Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations

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  • Brams Steven J.

    (New York University)

Abstract

In the last twenty years or so years, there has been a surge of interest in modeling both national security and international political economy issues using the tools of game theory. In this brief note, I will not cite this now extensive literature but instead (1) outline four major theoretical problems that have bedeviled various attempts at modeling international relations (IR) phenomena and processes and (2) propose an alternative approach, grounded in game theory, that I and others have found attractive in (i) capturing the thinking of decision makers and (ii) realistically modeling their strategic choices in a parsimonious but historically informed way.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams Steven J., 2000. "Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:6:y:2000:i:2:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    2. Lester A. Zeager & Johnathan B. Bascom, 1996. "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 460-485, September.
    3. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
    4. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    5. Ben D. Mor & Zeev Maoz, 1999. "Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 1-48, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lester A. Zeager, 2002. "The Role of Strategic Threats in Refugee Resettlement," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 159-191, May.
    2. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.

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