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Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves

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  • Stephen Willson

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  • Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:201-240
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004946714084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    2. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.
    3. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2022. "Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 349-362, March.
    2. Ericson Richard E. & Zeager Lester A., 2015. "Ukraine Crisis 2014: A Study of Russian-Western Strategic Interaction," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 153-190, April.
    3. Brams Steven J., 2000. "Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, April.
    4. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    5. Edwin Woerdman, 2000. "Rationality And Stability In The Theory Of Moves," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(1), pages 67-86, February.
    6. Willson, Stephen J., 2000. "Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 323-348, May.
    7. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.

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