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Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation

Author

Listed:
  • Lester A. Zeager

    (Department of Economics, East Carolina University)

  • Johnathan B. Bascom

    (Department of Geography, East Carolina University)

Abstract

The authors present a game-theoretic analysis of negotiations involving two players: the government of a country of origin and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in which the latter represents refugees, countries of asylum, and donor countries at the negotiating table. Ordinal preference orderings of outcomes allow the authors to represent the attitudes of governments in countries of origin toward their refugees as well as the urgency of repatriation for countries of asylum and donor countries. For alternative configurations of preference orderings, the authors analyze repatriation negotiations using classical game theory and the theory of moves, which assume different rules of play. They find the theory of moves is better suited for understanding efforts to achieve repatriation agreements in actual refugee crises and conclude with reflections on the difficulties of reaching repatriation agreements in recent years.

Suggested Citation

  • Lester A. Zeager & Johnathan B. Bascom, 1996. "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 460-485, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:3:p:460-485
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arroyo, Santiago & Alegría, Alexander, 2009. "El conflicto colombo-venezolano y la construcción de escenarios desde la Teoría de Juegos [The Colombo-Venezuelan conflict and the construction of scenes from Theory of Games]," MPRA Paper 24396, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2009.
    2. Lester A. Zeager, "undated". "A Model of Strategic Behavior in Three Cuban Refugee Crises," Working Papers 0202, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    3. Brams Steven J., 2000. "Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, April.
    4. Arroyo, Santiago & Bolaños, Juan, 2010. "Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos [Diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during 2006-2009: a look from the theory of gam," MPRA Paper 28751, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Nov 2010.
    5. Paolo VERME, 2016. "The Economics Of Forced Displacement: An Introduction," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 44, pages 141-163.
    6. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    7. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa & Baer-Nawrocka, Agnieszka, 2019. "Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU: Expected results and their social acceptance," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 607-622.
    8. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa, 2016. "Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 44-53.

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