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A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict

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  • Libman Alexander

    (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Russian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

The paper provides an extremely simple model of the interaction of international and internal conflicts. Specifically, it analyzes the situation when investments in both domestic and international wars are complementary. Therefore it predicts a possibility of inefficiently high spending for the international conflict due to the threat of the domestic revolution. The results are debated from the point of view of several cases of military conflicts caused by the domestic regime stability considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Libman Alexander, 2010. "A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:16:y:2010:i:1:n:10
    DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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