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The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts

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  • Bennour, Khaled

Abstract

This paper extends the prey--predator model of Grossman and Kim (1995) to analyze the relation between the value of the contested rent and the emergence of a conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes the conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That's when its valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compare to that of the prey.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennour, Khaled, 2008. "The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 15013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15013
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:elg:eechap:15325_5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "A small victorious war: political institutions and international conflict," MPRA Paper 17041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2013. "Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking," Working Papers hal-04141218, HAL.
    4. Libman Alexander, 2010. "A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, December.
    5. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict-size;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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