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Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation

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  • Edwards Jeremy S. S.

    (University of Cambridge,Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

  • Weichenrieder Alfons J.

    (Goethe University Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 1, Frankfurt am Main,Hesse, Germany)

Abstract

Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder, the beneficial effects on minority shareholders of increased ownership (greater monitoring of management, and reduced incentives to exploit minority shareholders due to greater cash-flow rights) are at least as large as, and sometimes significantly larger than, the harmful effect (greater private benefits of control due to greater control rights).

Suggested Citation

  • Edwards Jeremy S. S. & Weichenrieder Alfons J., 2004. "Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 143-171, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:143-171
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-6485.2004.00100.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mauricio Jara‐Bertin & Félix J. López‐Iturriaga & Óscar López‐de‐Foronda, 2008. "The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms: How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 146-159, May.
    2. Jeremy Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2004. "How Weak is the Weakest-Link Principle? On the Measurement of Firm Owners’ Control Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series 1255, CESifo.
    3. Christoph Kaserer & Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2008. "Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, March.
    4. Edwards, Jeremy S.S. & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2009. "Control rights, pyramids, and the measurement of ownership concentration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 489-508, October.
    5. Vito Polito, 2012. "Up or Down? Capital Income Taxation in the United States and the United Kingdom," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(1), pages 48-82, March.
    6. James Foreman-Peck & Leslie Hannah, 2012. "Some Consequences of the Early Twentieth Century Divorce of Ownership from Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-864, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Farooq, Omar & Zarouali, Ilham, 2016. "Financial centers and ownership concentration: When is ownership concentration value relevant? Evidence from an emerging market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 236-245.
    8. Ann-Kristin Achleitner & Christian Andres & Andre Betzer & Charlie Weir, 2011. "Wealth effects of private equity investments on the German stock market," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 217-239.
    9. Ruiz-Mallorquí, María Victoria & Santana-Martín, Domingo J., 2011. "Dominant institutional owners and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 118-129, January.
    10. Klaus Gugler, 2013. "The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 343-362, May.
    11. Schmidt, Reinhard H., 2003. "Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/36, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    12. Jara-Bertin, Mauricio & López-Iturriaga, Félix J., 2008. "Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms," MPRA Paper 9660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Salma Fourati, 2008. "Transferts négociés de blocs de contrôle, bénéfices privés et protection des actionnaires minoritaires," Post-Print halshs-00524890, HAL.
    14. Joachim Schwalbach, 2004. "Discussion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 173-176, May.
    15. Chirinko Robert & Garretsen Harry & Ees Hans van & Sterken Elmer, 2004. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 119-138, May.
    16. Óscar López‐de‐Foronda & Félix J. López‐Iturriaga & Marcos Santamaría‐Mariscal, 2007. "Ownership Structure, Sharing of Control and Legal Framework: international evidence," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1130-1143, November.
    17. Prabirjit Sarkar, 2009. "Do the English Legal Origin Countries have More Dispersed Share Ownership and More Developed Financial Systems?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 73-86.
    18. Mijoč Ivo & Alić Martina Briš & Drvenkar Nataša, 2024. "What We Know So Far about Transfer Pricing: a Bibliometric Analysis," Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 27(1), pages 253-282.
    19. Jostarndt, Philipp & Sautner, Zacharias, 2008. "Financial distress, corporate control, and management turnover," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2188-2204, October.
    20. Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Profit shifting in the EU: evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 281-297, June.
    21. Paul G. Mahoney, 2012. "The Public Utility Pyramids," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-66.

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