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Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

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  • Jara-Bertin, Mauricio
  • López-Iturriaga, Félix J.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms using a sample of firms from 11 European countries. We consider how the contest to the control of the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management in these firms. We find that increased contestability of the control of the largest shareholder reduces earnings management in family-owned firms. Our results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.

Suggested Citation

  • Jara-Bertin, Mauricio & López-Iturriaga, Félix J., 2008. "Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms," MPRA Paper 9660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9660
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    Cited by:

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    2. Juan Manuel San Martín Reyna, 2012. "An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure, Earnings Management and Growth Opportunities in Mexican Market," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 2(7), pages 103-123, December.
    3. Juan M. San Martin-Reyna & Jorge A. Durán-Encalada, 2012. "Ownership Structure, Earnings Management and Investment Opportunity Set: Evidence from Mexican Firms," Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation, Fundacja Upowszechniająca Wiedzę i Naukę "Cognitione", vol. 8(3), pages 35-57.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate control; discretionary accruals; earnings management; family firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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