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The exchange theory of web3 governance

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  • Darcy W. E. Allen
  • Chris Berg
  • Aaron M. Lane
  • Trent MacDonald
  • Jason Potts

Abstract

Blockchains have enabled innovation in distributed economic institutions, such as money (e.g., cryptocurrencies) and markets (e.g., decentralised exchanges), but also innovations in distributed governance, such as decentralised autonomous organisations. These innovations have generated academic interest in studying web3 governance, but as yet there is no general theory of web3 governance. In this paper, we draw on the contrast between a ‘romantic view’ of governance (characterised by consensus through community voting) and the ‘exchange view’ of governance from public choice theory (characterised by an entrepreneurial process of bargaining and exchange of voters under uncertainty). Our analysis is the first to argue that the latter ‘exchange view’ of governance is best to understand the dynamics of governance innovation in web3, providing the foundations for a new general theory of governance in this frontier field. We apply the ‘exchange view’ of governance to three case studies (Curve, Lido and Metagov), exploring how these projects enable pseudonymous, composable and permissionless governance processes to reveal value. Our approach helps illuminate how this emergent polycentric governance process can generate robustness in decentralised systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Darcy W. E. Allen & Chris Berg & Aaron M. Lane & Trent MacDonald & Jason Potts, 2023. "The exchange theory of web3 governance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(4), pages 659-675, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:76:y:2023:i:4:p:659-675
    DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12345
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