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Blockchains and constitutional catallaxy

Author

Listed:
  • Alastair Berg

    (RMIT University)

  • Chris Berg

    (RMIT University)

  • Mikayla Novak

    (The Australian National University)

Abstract

The proposition that constitutional rules serve as permanent, fixed points of interaction is challenged by the existence of contestable rule amendment and the emergence of de facto authority. This observation not only applies to conventional political constitutions, but to the fundamental rules which govern interactions by numerous people using new forms of technology. Blockchain technology aims to coordinate action in a world of incomplete information and opportunism, but the governance arrangements in blockchain protocols remain far from settled. Drawing upon recent theoretical developments regarding constitutional change, we interpret changes to the fundamental working rules of blockchain protocols as central to the adaptive, emergent nature of activity within this technological space. We apply this concept of “constitutional catallaxy” to selected blockchain platform case studies, illustrating the dynamism inherent in establishing protocols within the blockchain. Blockchain coordination changes and adapts not only to the technological limitations of the available protocols, but to mutual expectations and influence of interacting stakeholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Berg & Chris Berg & Mikayla Novak, 2020. "Blockchains and constitutional catallaxy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 188-204, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:31:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-020-09303-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09303-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Howell, Bronwyn E. & Potgieter, Petrus H. & Sadowski, Bert M., 2019. "Governance of Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology Projects," 2nd Europe – Middle East – North African Regional ITS Conference, Aswan 2019: Leveraging Technologies For Growth 201737, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    2. Plinio Limata, 2020. "Blockchain and Institutions (II): The Realm of Law," CERBE Working Papers wpC36, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Blockchain; Constitution; Distributed ledger technology; Entrepreneurship; Rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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