IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/jepppp/jepp-03-2019-0013.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance

Author

Listed:
  • Nick Cowen

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible contributions of blockchain technology to creating new governance structures that facilitate social cooperation. Design/methodology/approach - Conceptual analysis with key ideas in new institutional economics and political theory is used in this paper. Findings - Blockchain technology provides a new tool through which political entrepreneurs can credibly alienate some of their power within a system of rules that they have established. Originality/value - This paper links discussion of blockchain entrepreneurship in commercial markets to research into private governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Nick Cowen, 2019. "Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(2), pages 213-226, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jepppp:jepp-03-2019-0013
    DOI: 10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Catherine England & Craig Fratrik, 2018. "Where to Bitcoin?," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 33(Spring 20), pages 9-30.
    2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith & Randolph M. Siverson & James D. Morrow, 2005. "The Logic of Political Survival," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524406, April.
    3. Leeson, Peter T. & Boettke, Peter J., 2009. "Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 252-259, September.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    5. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    6. Ying fan and Adonis Yatchew, 2016. "Introduction," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(China Spe).
    7. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    8. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, September.
    9. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    10. Davidson, Sinclair & De Filippi, Primavera & Potts, Jason, 2018. "Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 639-658, August.
    11. Hayek, F. A., 2011. "The Constitution of Liberty," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226315379 edited by Hamowy, Ronald.
    12. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
    13. Hayek, F. A., 2014. "The Market and Other Orders," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226089553 edited by Caldwell, Bruce.
    14. John Meadowcroft, 2014. "Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 85-100, January.
    15. Andrei Shleifer, 2009. "The Age of Milton Friedman," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(1), pages 123-135, March.
    16. Richard E. Wagner, 2016. "Politics as a Peculiar Business," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16989.
    17. Rainer Böhme & Nicolas Christin & Benjamin Edelman & Tyler Moore, 2015. "Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(2), pages 213-238, Spring.
    18. J. Leon Zhao & Shaokun Fan & Jiaqi Yan, 2016. "Overview of business innovations and research opportunities in blockchain and introduction to the special issue," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 2(1), pages 1-7, December.
    19. Salter, Alexander William, 2015. "Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 725-734, November.
    20. Stringham, Edward Peter, 2015. "Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199365166.
    21. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, October.
    2. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
    3. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    4. Alexander W. Salter, 2020. "Private Prerogative, Public Purpose: Political Entrepreneurship and Management in Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Spring 20), pages 1-28.
    5. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    6. Geloso, Vincent J. & Salter, Alexander W., 2020. "State capacity and economic development: Causal mechanism or correlative filter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 372-385.
    7. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019. "The political economy of legal titling," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 251-268, September.
    8. Allen, Darcy W.E. & Berg, Chris & Markey-Towler, Brendan & Novak, Mikayla & Potts, Jason, 2020. "Blockchain and the evolution of institutional technologies: Implications for innovation policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).
    9. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
    10. Lee, Jei Young, 2019. "A decentralized token economy: How blockchain and cryptocurrency can revolutionize business," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 62(6), pages 773-784.
    11. Nick Cowen, 2018. "Robust Against Whom?," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: Austrian Economics: The Next Generation, volume 23, pages 91-111, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    12. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    13. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, September.
    14. Darcy W.E. Allen, 2019. "Governing the entrepreneurial discovery of blockchain applications," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(2), pages 194-212, October.
    15. Leeson, Peter T. & Suarez, Paola A., 2016. "An economic analysis of Magna Carta," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(S), pages 40-46.
    16. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2020. "Medieval European traditions in representation and state capacity today," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 133-186, June.
    17. Palagashvili,Liya & Piano,Ennio & Skarbek,David, 2017. "The Decline and Rise of Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316649176, October.
    18. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    19. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
    20. Min Xu & Xingtong Chen & Gang Kou, 2019. "A systematic review of blockchain," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 1-14, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jepppp:jepp-03-2019-0013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.