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Entangled Political Economy: A Keynote Address

In: Entangled Political Economy

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  • Richard E. Wagner

Abstract

This paper is a keynote address prepared for a conference on “Entangled Political Economy” sponsored by the Wirth Institute. In keeping with the conventions of such an address, I look both backward and forward, while placing more emphasis on looking forward. In looking backward, I compare and contrast two orientations toward political economy: additive and entangled. In looking forward, I explore some of the analytical challenges that confront efforts to pursue a vision of entangled political economy. While these challenges are substantive in character, those efforts necessarily rest on methodological presumptions. Accordingly, the paper opens by reviewing some of those methodological presumptions before turning to the substantive articulations and challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard E. Wagner, 2014. "Entangled Political Economy: A Keynote Address," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: Entangled Political Economy, volume 18, pages 15-36, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420140000018000
    DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420140000018000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    2. Richard E. Wagner, 2007. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12713.
    3. Wagner, Richard E., 2012. "A macro economy as an ecology of plans," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 433-444.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    5. Richard Wagner, 2012. "Viennese kaleidics: Why it’s liberty more than policy that calms turbulence," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 283-297, December.
    6. Roger Koppl, 2002. "Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-62924-0, October.
    7. Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner, 2011. "States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 573-585, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entangled political economy; additive political economy; centralized mindset; conflicting rationalities; architecture of governance; B41; D78; D85; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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