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A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model

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  • Tullock, Gordon

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  • Tullock, Gordon, 1970. "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 419-426, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:60:y:1970:i:3:p:419-26
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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    2. repec:esx:essedp:731 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li & Jiwei Qian, 2018. "Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 197-214, April.
    4. Peter Bernholz, 1973. "Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-95, June.
    5. May Tajima & Niall M. Fraser, 2001. "Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-235, May.
    6. Sarah Jacobson & Jason Delaney, 2012. "The Good of the Few: Reciprocity in the Provision of a Public Bad," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-02, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    7. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 209-236.
    8. Hirschel Kasper, 1971. "On political competition, economic policy, and income maintenance programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, March.
    9. Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2014. "Pork-Barrel Spending under Cournot Legislators and the Quantity Equation," MPRA Paper 61116, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
    11. Omar A. Guerrero & Ulrich Matter, 2016. "Revealing the Anatomy of Vote Trading," Papers 1611.01381, arXiv.org.
    12. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.
    13. Crombez, Christophe, 2000. "Spatial models of logrolling in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 707-737, November.
    14. Peter Kotzian, 2002. "Stuck in the Middle: Welfare Effects of the European Pharmaceutical Markets' Incomplete Integration and a Possible Remedy," MZES Working Papers 59, MZES.
    15. David Shapiro, 1971. "Pressure groups and public investment decisions: A note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 103-108, March.
    16. Ryan C. Amacher & Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, 1975. "A Budget Size in a Democracy: A Review of the Arguments," Public Finance Review, , vol. 3(2), pages 99-122, April.
    17. Guerrero, Omar & Matter, Ulrich, 2021. "Quantifying Vote Trading Through Network Reciprocity," Economics Working Paper Series 2106, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    18. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    19. Richard Wallick, 2012. "Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 223-244, July.
    20. Michael Reksulak & William Shughart, 2012. "What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 103-114, July.
    21. Dennis Mueller & Geoffrey Philpotts & Jaroslav Vanek, 1972. "The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 55-79, September.
    22. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    23. Joseph Persky, 2001. "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 199-208, Fall.
    24. Pierre Salmon, 2017. "Is democracy exportable?," Working Papers halshs-01516493, HAL.

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