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The Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index and the Distribution of Social Surplus

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  • Yossi Spiegel

Abstract

I show that in a broad range of oligopoly models, the Herfindahl‐Hirschman index (HHI) reflects the ratio of producer surplus to consumer surplus and therefore the division of surplus between firms’ owners and consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Yossi Spiegel, 2021. "The Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index and the Distribution of Social Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 561-594, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:561-594
    DOI: 10.1111/joie.12253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Concentration-Based Inference for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers," Papers 2407.12924, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    2. Lancieri, Filippo Maria & Valleti, Tommaso, 2024. "Towards an effective merger review policy: A defence of rebuttable structural presumptions," Working Papers 345, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    3. Makoto Hanazono & Noritaka Kudoh, 2024. "Prominence And Market Power: Asymmetric Oligopoly With Sequential Consumer Search," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1249-1281, August.
    4. Pengyu Chen & Abd Alwahed Dagestani, 2023. "Greenwashing behavior and firm value – From the perspective of board characteristics," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(5), pages 2330-2343, September.
    5. Mo Chen & Xuhua Hu & Jijian Zhang & Zhe Xu & Guang Yang & Zenan Sun, 2023. "Are Firms More Willing to Seek Green Technology Innovation in the Context of Economic Policy Uncertainty? —Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(19), pages 1-24, September.
    6. Suguru Otani & Takuma Matsuda, 2023. "Unified Merger List in the Container Shipping Industry from 1966 to 2022: A Structural Estimation of M&A Matching," Papers 2310.09938, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    7. Cui, Xin & Wang, Chunfeng & Sensoy, Ahmet & Liao, Jing & Xie, Xiaochen, 2023. "Economic policy uncertainty and green innovation: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    8. Weikang Zhang & Isabel K. M. Yan & Yin-Wong Cheung, 2023. "The COVID-19 pandemics and import demand elasticities: evidence from China’s customs data," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25, December.
    9. Xin Su & Shengwen Wang, 2024. "Impact of China’s free trade zones on the innovation performance of firms: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-17, December.

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