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Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers

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  • Nathan H. Miller

    (Georgetown University)

  • Gloria Sheu

    (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)

Abstract

We describe the quantitative modeling techniques that are used in horizontal merger review for the evaluation of unilateral effects, and discuss how the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines helped legitimize these methods and motivate scholarly research. We cover markets that feature differentiated products pricing, auctions and negotiations, and homogeneous products, in turn. We also develop connections between quantitative modeling and market concentration screens that are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:58:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-020-09805-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09805-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Falk Bräuning & José Fillat & Gustavo Joaquim, 2022. "Cost-Price Relationships in a Concentrated Economy," Current Policy Perspectives 94265, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Steven T. Berry & Philip A. Haile, 2024. "Nonparametric Identification of Differentiated Products Demand Using Micro Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(4), pages 1135-1162, July.
    3. Mansley, Ryan & Miller, Nathan H. & Sheu, Gloria & Weinberg, Matthew C., 2023. "A price leadership model for merger analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    4. Michael Vita & Keith Brand & Miriam Larson-Koester & Nathan Petek & Charles Taragin & William Violette & Daniel H. Wood, 2022. "Economics at the FTC: Estimating Harm from Deception and Analyzing Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 405-438, December.
    5. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Market Definition: A Sensitivity Analysis," Papers 2407.12774, arXiv.org.
    6. Joanna Fister & Catherine Matraves & Martha Stancill & Donald Stockdale & Sean Sullivan & Shane Taylor & Aleksandr Yankelevich, 2022. "Economics at the FCC 2021–22: 5G Spectrum Auctions, Affordable Connectivity, Broadband Data Collection, and Merger Review," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 489-520, December.
    7. Paul S. Koh, 2024. "Merger Analysis with Latent Price," Papers 2404.07684, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; Antitrust; Unilateral effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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