On the Efficiency of the Rank-Order Contract under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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DOI: 10.1086/209868
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests," Working Papers 600, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03263984, HAL.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2016. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests," Working Papers 789, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," Post-Print hal-03263984, HAL.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012. "The distribution of talent across contests," Economics Working Papers 1298, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2013.
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2017. "Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 675-690, September.
- Christian Riis, 2010. "Efficient Contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 643-665, September.
- Riis, Christian, 2008. "Efficient Contests," MPRA Paper 10906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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