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Cooperation against all predictions

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  • Friedel Bolle
  • Jörg Spiller

Abstract

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non‐cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four‐player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k

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  • Friedel Bolle & Jörg Spiller, 2021. "Cooperation against all predictions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 904-924, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:3:p:904-924
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12976
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    2. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2022. "Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 711-740, May.
    3. Shakun D. Mago & Jennifer Pate, 2023. "Greed and fear: Competitive and charitable priming in a threshold volunteer's dilemma," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 138-161, January.
    4. Boris Ginzburg, 2023. "Slacktivism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(2), pages 126-143, April.
    5. Friedel Bolle, 2021. "Deterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-15, May.
    6. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto & Lekfuangfu, Warn N., 2023. "Critical Mass in Collective Action," MPRA Paper 117139, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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