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Payoff Levels, Loss Avoidance, And Equilibrium Selection In Games With Multiple Equilibria: An Experimental Study

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  • NICK FELTOVICH
  • ATSUSHI IWASAKI
  • SOBEI H. ODA

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  • Nick Feltovich & Atsushi Iwasaki & Sobei H. Oda, 2012. "Payoff Levels, Loss Avoidance, And Equilibrium Selection In Games With Multiple Equilibria: An Experimental Study," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 932-952, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:50:y:2012:i:4:p:932-952
    DOI: j.1465-7295.2011.00406.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Bolton Gary E. & Feldhaus Christoph & Ockenfels Axel, 2016. "Social Interaction Promotes Risk Taking in a Stag Hunt Game," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 409-423, August.
    2. Trabelsi, Emna & Hichri, Walid, 2021. "Central Bank Transparency with (semi-)public Information: Laboratory Experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Dal Bó, Pedro & Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kim, Jeongbin, 2021. "The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 352-368.
    4. Poulsen, Odile & Saral, Krista J., 2018. "Coordination and focality under gain–loss framing: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 75-78.
    5. Werner Güth & Manfred Stadler & Alexandra Zaby, 2019. "Coordination Failure in Capacity-then-Price-Setting Games," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 111-133, December.
    6. Friedel Bolle & Jörg Spiller, 2021. "Cooperation against all predictions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 904-924, July.
    7. Hajimoladarvish , Narges, 2021. "Explaining Heterogeneity in Risk Preferences Using a Finite Mixture Model," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 16(4), pages 533-554, December.
    8. Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile, 2015. "Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 191-199.
    9. Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 96-104.
    10. Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "Prospect dynamics and loss dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 98-124.
    11. Yuanji Wen & Stijn Masschelein & Anmol Ratan, 2022. "Loss aversion in asymmetric anti‐coordination games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1549-1573, April.
    12. Martens, Nikolai & Orzen, Henrik, 2021. "Escalating commitment to a failing course of action — A re-examination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    13. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2016. "Earnings benchmarks, information systems, and their impact on the degree of honesty in managerial reporting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-62.
    14. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2016. "Earnings benchmarks, information systems, and their impact on the degree of honesty in managerial reporting," Other publications TiSEM 5918f2bd-a456-4e49-989f-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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