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Points Or Prison? The Effects Of Different Sanctions On Driving Behavior

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  • Silvia Bruzzone
  • Stefano Castriota
  • Mirco Tonin

Abstract

We compare two reforms aimed at reducing road accidents in Italy. The Penalty Points System (PPS) provides drivers with a score and curtails points after infractions. The license is temporarily suspended when points are exhausted. Losing points is easy, but the penalty is mild. The Road Homicide (RH) introduces heavy penalties in the rare event of injuries and/or fatalities. In terms of probability and intensity of the penalty the two policies are therefore diametrically opposed. We find that injuries and fatalities decrease more with PPS than with RH. Comparing costs and benefits, we conclude that strong penalties are not beneficial. (JEL D91, K14, K42, R41)

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Bruzzone & Stefano Castriota & Mirco Tonin, 2021. "Points Or Prison? The Effects Of Different Sanctions On Driving Behavior," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 126-140, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:39:y:2021:i:1:p:126-140
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12500
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rinaldo Brau & Marco Nieddu & S. Balia, 2021. "Depowering Risk: Vehicle Power Restriction and Teen Driver Accidents in Italy," Working Paper CRENoS 202101, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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