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Trade Defense Actions in Arab Countries' Free Trade Agreements with the U.S.: The Case of Safeguards

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  • Malkawi, Bashar H.

Abstract

The purpose of all free trade agreements is, among other things, to liberalize trade and increase market access. Mindful that requiring trade liberalization could result in damaging consequences among the participating countries that are at different levels of economic development, the U.S.–Arab countries free trade agreements (FTAs) include exceptions. These FTAs permit countries to depart “temporarily” from their obligations of liberalizing trade, and apply safeguard measures. This article surveys safeguard provisions on trade in goods in U.S.–Arab countries FTAs. In particular, the article identifies those FTAs that modify the conditions applicable to the partner either substantively or procedurally in the event that a global safeguard is invoked. In the case of bilateral safeguards, the article analyses provisions governing injury assessment and causation, conditions for the invocation of a measure, and the types of measures that may be employed. The article uses, whenever possible, the yardstick of GATT Article XIX and the WTO Safeguards Agreement to determine whether the provisions applicable to bilateral safeguard measures are more or less stringent than the corresponding multilateral rules. The article also examines the reference to infant industry and special safeguards applicable to textile and agricultural products found in these FTAs. The article concludes with a set of suggestions.

Suggested Citation

  • Malkawi, Bashar H., 2016. "Trade Defense Actions in Arab Countries' Free Trade Agreements with the U.S.: The Case of Safeguards," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 17(1), pages 1-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ecjilt:244919
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.244919
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bown, Chad P., 2002. "Why are safeguards under the WTO so unpopular?," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 47-62, March.
    2. Finger, J. Michael, 2010. "A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports: what experience with other GATT/WTO safeguards tells us about what might work," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 289-318, April.
    3. P. K. M. Tharakan, 2000. "The Problem of Anti-Dumping Protection and Developing Country Exports," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2000-198, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Development; International Relations/Trade;

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration

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