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Reassessing the Safeguards Mess

Author

Listed:
  • Bernard Hoekman
  • Petros Mavroidis

Abstract

The WTO Agreement on Safeguards was hailed as an important achievement of the Uruguay round,rightly so, given that it managed to outlaw the use of voluntary export restraints. Intended to facilitatethe use of transparent, temporary, and non-discriminatory instruments to assist domestic industriesinjured by import competition, World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence undermined therealization of this objective. Worse, erratic case law created negative externalities, ranging fromgreater recourse to more discriminatory trade practices and use by the United States (US) of thetypes of managed trade that the Agreement of Safeguards was meant to abolish. As in the classicbootlegger-Baptist metaphor in the literature on regulation, the unintended consequence of WTOjurisprudence on safeguards has been more rather than less selective protection (discriminatorytrade policies). As, if not more important, it made it more difficult for WTO members to use aninstrument intended to assist governments in sustaining political support for an open trade regime.In this paper, we describe the source of discomfort and suggest ways to address it in a meaningfulmanner.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, 2023. "Reassessing the Safeguards Mess," RSCAS Working Papers 2023/14, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2023/14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sykes, Alan O., 2006. "The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: A Commentary," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199277407.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emergency protection; safeguards; trade agreements; WTO; Appellate Body;
    All these keywords.

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