IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/rdevec/v19y2015i2p434-447.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Economy of Altering Trade Restrictions in Response to Commodity Price Spikes

Author

Listed:
  • Jayanthi Thennakoon

Abstract

A model is developed to explain trade policy interventions in response to commodity price spikes. The model predicts that government preferences for averting losses for domestic interest groups lead to changes in trade distortions. In particular, trade interventions in response to downward price spikes are predicted, which is consistent with the proposal for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Higher tariffs are likely in a noncooperative setting, and higher export subsidies will emerge in response. An efficient cooperative trade policy can be achieved in a repeated game setting and with possible involvement of the WTO.

Suggested Citation

  • Jayanthi Thennakoon, 2015. "Political Economy of Altering Trade Restrictions in Response to Commodity Price Spikes," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 434-447, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:19:y:2015:i:2:p:434-447
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/rode.12152
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hertel, Thomas W. & Martin, William J. & Leister, Amanda M., 2010. "Potential Implications of a Special Safeguard Mechanism in the WTO: the Case of Wheat," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61000, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Will Martin & Kym Anderson, 2012. "Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During Commodity Price Booms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(2), pages 422-427.
    3. Jason H. Grant & Karl D. Meilke, 2006. "The World Trade Organization Special Safeguard Mechanism: A Case Study of Wheat," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 24-47.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, 2007. "Trade adjustment in the WTO system: are more safeguards the answer?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 23(3), pages 415-439, Autumn.
    6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    7. Anderson, Kym & Nelgen, Signe, 2012. "Trade Barrier Volatility and Agricultural Price Stabilization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 36-48.
    8. Michael O. Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2011. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 601-619, November.
    9. Finger, J. Michael, 2010. "A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports: what experience with other GATT/WTO safeguards tells us about what might work," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 289-318, April.
    10. Wolfe, Robert, 2009. "The special safeguard fiasco in the WTO: the perils of inadequate analysis and negotiation," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 517-544, October.
    11. repec:bla:rdevec:v:14:y:2010:i:s1:p:405-416 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June.
    13. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
    14. Tovar, Patricia, 2009. "The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 154-167, June.
    15. Brian D. Wright, 2011. "The Economics of Grain Price Volatility," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 32-58.
    16. Thomas W. Hertel & Will Martin & Amanda M. Leister, 2010. "Potential Implications of a Special Safeguard Mechanism in the World Trade Organization: the Case of Wheat," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 24(2), pages 330-359, August.
    17. Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 35-48, September.
    18. Caroline Freund & Caglar Ozden, 2008. "Trade Policy and Loss Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1675-1691, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wenshou Yan & Kaixing Huang, 2022. "Geographic politics, loss aversion and trade policy: The case of cotton in China," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(9), pages 2854-2881, September.
    2. Donald MacLaren, 2016. "The Contingent Tariff of the Special Safeguard Mechanism: What Happens When Markets are Imperfectly Competitive?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 62-83, February.
    3. Wenshou Yan & Yan Cai & Faqin Lin & Dessie Tarko Ambaw, 2021. "The Impacts of Trade Restrictions on World Agricultural Price Volatility during the COVID‐19 Pandemic," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 29(6), pages 139-158, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thennakoon, Jayanthi & Anderson, Kym, 2015. "Could the proposed WTO Special Safeguard Mechanism protect farmers from low international prices?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 106-113.
    2. Kym Anderson, 2016. "Agricultural Trade, Policy Reforms, and Global Food Security," Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-46925-0, November.
    3. Anderson, Kym, 2022. "Trade-related food policies in a more volatile climate and trade environment," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    4. Anderson, Kym & Nelgen, Signe, 2012. "Trade Barrier Volatility and Agricultural Price Stabilization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 36-48.
    5. Kym Anderson & Signe Nelgen, 2012. "Agricultural trade distortions during the global financial crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 28(2), pages 235-260, SUMMER.
    6. Wenshou Yan & Kaixing Huang, 2022. "Geographic politics, loss aversion and trade policy: The case of cotton in China," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(9), pages 2854-2881, September.
    7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Paolo E. Giordani & Nadia Rocha & Michele Ruta, 2012. "Food Prices and the Multiplier Effect of Export Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3783, CESifo.
    9. Christophe Gouel, 2016. "Trade Policy Coordination and Food Price Volatility," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1018-1037.
    10. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    11. Giordani, Paolo E. & Rocha, Nadia & Ruta, Michele, 2016. "Food prices and the multiplier effect of trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 102-122.
    12. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    13. Karapinar, Baris & Tanaka, Tetsuji, 2013. "How to Improve World Food Supply Stability Under Future Uncertainty: Potential Role of WTO Regulation on Export Restrictions in Rice," 135th Seminar, August 28-30, 2013, Belgrade, Serbia 160387, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    14. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    15. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2014. "Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 102-118.
    16. Richard Chisik & Chuyi Fang, 2024. "Cross‐retaliation and international dispute settlement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(4), pages 1137-1181, November.
    17. Staiger, Robert & Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Espitia,Alvaro & Rocha,Nadia & Ruta,Michele, 2020. "Covid-19 and Food Protectionism : The Impact of the Pandemic and Export Restrictions on World Food Markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9253, The World Bank.
    19. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Time Inconsistency of Trade Policy and Multilateralism," International Trade 0402002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Emma Aisbett & Magdalene Silberberger, 2021. "Tariff liberalization and product standards: Regulatory chill and race to the bottom?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 987-1006, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:19:y:2015:i:2:p:434-447. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.