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How different are safeguards from antidumping ? evidence from us trade policies toward steel

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  • Bown, Chad P.

Abstract

Use of temporary trade barriers has proliferated across countries, industries, and even policy instruments. This paper constructs a panel of bilateral, product-level United States steel imports that are matched to a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that are associated with the 2002 United States steel safeguard in order to compare the trade impacts that result from application of various temporary trade barrier policies over 1989-2003. The analysis finds that the trade effects of an applied safeguard -- which is statutorily expected to follow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment -- can nevertheless compare closely with the application of the explicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. The results on trade policy substitutability complement other recent research on these increasingly important forms of import protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Bown, Chad P., 2013. "How different are safeguards from antidumping ? evidence from us trade policies toward steel," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6378, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6378
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free Trade; Trade Policy; Water and Industry; Trade Law; Markets and Market Access;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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