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The New International Financial Architecture: Bail-ins, Bail-outs, Bail-ups and Newspeak

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  • George Fane

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  • George Fane, 2001. "The New International Financial Architecture: Bail-ins, Bail-outs, Bail-ups and Newspeak," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 8(3), pages 223-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:8:y:2001:i:3:p:223-233
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    File URL: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p91831/pdf/8-3-A-3.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would collective action clauses raise borrowing costs? - an update and additional results," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2363, The World Bank.
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