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La gestion des crises de liquidité internationale : logique de faillite, prêteur en dernier ressort et conditionnalité

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  • Jérôme Sgard

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  • Jérôme Sgard, 2000. "La gestion des crises de liquidité internationale : logique de faillite, prêteur en dernier ressort et conditionnalité," Working Papers 2000-16, CEPII research center.
    • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:2000-16
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General

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