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Crisis Resolution: Next Steps

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth Kletzer
  • Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen
  • Mr. Ashoka Mody

Abstract

At the April 2003 meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committees, it was decided to further encourage the contractual approach to smoothing the process of sovereign debt restructuring by encouraging the more widespread use of collective action clauses (CACs) in international bonds. This decision was shaped partly by Mexico's successful launch of a bond subject to New York law but featuring CACs, and by subsequent issues with similar provisions from other emerging market countries. This paper reviews the developments leading up to that event, its implications, and prospects for the future. It asks whether we can expect to see additional issuance by emerging markets of bonds featuring CACs, whether such a trend would in fact help to make the world a safer financial place, and what additional steps might be taken to further enhance modalities for crisis resolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Kletzer & Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen & Mr. Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," IMF Working Papers 2003/196, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2003/196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WP; action clause; debt restructuring; single bond; bond market; debt repayment; debtor country; expected return; GNP ratio; short-term debt; Collective Action; Aggregation; Transition; borrowing cost; Collective action clauses; Bonds; Moral hazard; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Credit ratings; Africa; Global;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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