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Staatliche Insolvenz in einer Währungsunion

Author

Listed:
  • Heinz-Dieter Smeets
  • Angélique Herzberg

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich - beispielhaft am Fall Griechenland - mit einem "geordneten" Insolvenzverfahren für Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Währungsunion. ZentraleAufgabe eines Insolvenzverfahrens ist es, über die Umstrukturierung der Staatsschulden des betroffenen Landes zu entscheiden. Vor dem Hintergrund der staatlichen Budgetrestriktion kann der Insolvenztatbestand anhand derjenigen Primärüberschussquote abgegrenzt werden, die notwendig ist, um den Schuldendienst aus eigener Kraft zu leisten. Übersteigt die notwendige Primärüberschussquote über einen bestimmten Zeitraum die zumutbare Primärüberschussquote, kann der Staat als insolvent gelten. Das Insolvenzverfahren kann durch den betroffenen Schuldnerstaat sowie die übrigen Mitgliedsländer beantragt werden. Zur Feststellung der Insolvenz sowie Durchführung des Verfahrens wird ein Insolvenzausschuss gebildet, dem die unmittelbar Betroffenen (der verschuldete Staat und seine Gläubiger), die übrigen Mitgliedsländer der EWU sowie eine neutrale Partei angehören.DenVorsitz im Insolvenzausschuss übernimmt die EU,welche auch Überbrückungskredite bereitstellt. Im Falle Griechenlands könnten sich die potenziellen Mitglieder des Insolvenzausschusses bereits vor der Schaffung eines rechtlich verankerten Insolvenzverfahrens im Sinne eines freiwilligenVerhaltenskodex auf Eckpunkte der Umstrukturierung einigen.

Suggested Citation

  • Heinz-Dieter Smeets & Angélique Herzberg, 2010. "Staatliche Insolvenz in einer Währungsunion," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 65(4), pages 379-399, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:auswrt:2010:65:4:379-399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kathrin Berensmann & Angélique Herzberg, 2009. "Sovereign Insolvency Procedures – A Comparative Look At Selected Proposals," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 856-881, December.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Heinz-Dieter Smeets, 2010. "Ist Griechenland noch zu retten?," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 90(5), pages 309-313, May.
    4. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
    6. Nouriel Roubini, 2002. "Do We Need a New Bankruptcy Regime?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 321-333.
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    Cited by:

    1. Smeets Heinz-Dieter & Schmid Anita, 2014. "Europäische Staatsschuldenkrise, Lender of last resort und Bankenunion / European sovereign debt crisis, lender of last resort and banking union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 47-74, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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