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Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?

Author

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  • Frank Daumann
  • Alfred Wassermann

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Daumann & Alfred Wassermann, 2009. "Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 429-441, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:3:p:429-441
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9402-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guth, Werner & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1997. "Do People Care about Democracy? An Experiment Exploring the Value of Voting Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 27-47, April.
    2. Thomas Schwartz, 1975. "Vote trading and Pareto efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 101-109, December.
    3. Blair, Douglas H & Golbe, Devra L & Gerard, James M, 1989. "Unbundling the Voting Rights and Profit Claims of Common Shares," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 420-443, April.
    4. Neeman, Zvika, 1999. "The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 685-703, October.
    5. Fischer, A J, 1999. "The Probability of Being Decisive," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(3-4), pages 267-283, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; Market for votes; Personal tax; Personal subsidies; D40; D72; H24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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