Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9402-6
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- Thomas Schwartz, 1975. "Vote trading and Pareto efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 101-109, December.
- Blair, Douglas H & Golbe, Devra L & Gerard, James M, 1989. "Unbundling the Voting Rights and Profit Claims of Common Shares," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 420-443, April.
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- Guth, Werner & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1997. "Do People Care about Democracy? An Experiment Exploring the Value of Voting Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 27-47, April.
- Neeman, Zvika, 1999. "The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 685-703, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting; Market for votes; Personal tax; Personal subsidies; D40; D72; H24;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
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