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Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements

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  • Abhinay Muthoo
  • Kenneth Shepsle

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  • Abhinay Muthoo & Kenneth Shepsle, 2010. "Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 1-36, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:144:y:2010:i:1:p:1-36
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
    4. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    5. Muthoo, Abhinay & Shepsle, Kenneth, 2007. "The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism," MPRA Paper 5825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Yianis Sarafidis, 2007. "What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 307-326, March.
    7. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    8. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    9. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    10. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    2. Bhattarai, Keshab, 2015. "Constitution, Institutions and A Model for Economic Development in Nepal," MPRA Paper 93261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Apr 2019.
    3. Ross Hickey, 2015. "Intergovernmental transfers and re-election concerned politicians," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 331-351, November.
    4. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan & Landa, Dimitri, 2015. "Political accountability and sequential policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 95-108.
    5. Bhattarai, Keshab, 2016. "Constitution, Institutions and Models for Economic Growth in Nepal," MPRA Paper 49819, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2019.
    6. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine.

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