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Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
  2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020. "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 105-121.
  3. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Resilient Information Aggregation," Papers 2307.05054, arXiv.org.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01988076, HAL.
  5. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023. "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers 2309.04193, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  7. Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023. "Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk," Papers 2302.00281, arXiv.org.
  8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
  9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Yi Liu & Yang Yu, 2024. "Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication," Papers 2411.19431, arXiv.org.
  11. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2024. "Persuasion and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2451-2487.
  12. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
  13. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2023. "Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 113-149.
  16. Jeahan Jung & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2019. "Cheap Talk by Two Senders in the Presence of Network Externalities," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 249-274.
  17. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
  18. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129, arXiv.org.
  19. Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023. "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  20. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org.
  22. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  23. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
  24. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers vie2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  25. Juuso Toikka & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  26. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2021. "Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  27. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers 2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  29. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
  30. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
  31. Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
  32. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  33. Little, Andrew T., 2022. "Bayesian Explanations for Persuasion," OSF Preprints ygw8e, Center for Open Science.
  34. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  35. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  36. Yuling Yan & Weijie J. Su & Jianqing Fan, 2023. "The Isotonic Mechanism for Exponential Family Estimation," Papers 2304.11160, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  37. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  38. Maxim Ivanov, 2024. "Perfect robust implementation by private information design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 753-787, November.
  39. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  40. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  41. Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
  42. Vohra, Akhil & Toikka, Juuso & Vohra, Rakesh, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  43. Ian Ball, 2019. "Scoring Strategic Agents," Papers 1909.01888, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
  44. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
  45. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2022. "Distributions of Posterior Quantiles and Economic Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2328R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2022.
  46. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Information transmission in monopolistic credence goods markets," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  47. Paula Onuchic, 2021. "Advisors with Hidden Motives," Papers 2103.07446, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  48. Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," Papers 2208.11835, arXiv.org.
  49. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  50. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  51. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2023. "Experiments versus distributions of posteriors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 58-60.
  52. Duraj, Jetlir & He, Kevin, 2024. "Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
  53. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  54. Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-925, December.
  55. Raphael Boleslavsky & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2023. "Signaling With Commitment," Papers 2305.00777, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  56. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
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