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Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

Author

Listed:
  • Habu, Takuma
  • Lipnowski, Elliot
  • Ravid, Doron

Abstract

We revisit the canonical model of repeated games with two patient players, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and make the substantive assumption that the informed player's preference is state independent. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which the initial stages are used only for revealing information, and no further information is revealed after the initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player's equilibrium payoff set.

Suggested Citation

  • Habu, Takuma & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ravid, Doron, 2024. "Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:221:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000942
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105888
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; Incomplete information; Transparent motives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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