Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design; Mechanism Design; Duality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-09-05 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2022-09-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-09-05 (Microeconomics)
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