Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment
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- Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2023. "Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 113-149.
- Valeria Burdea & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2018. "Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 2018-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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More about this item
Keywords
communication; partially verifiable messages; verification control; experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2020-09-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2020-09-14 (Game Theory)
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