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Second Opinions and the Humility Threshold

Author

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  • David Lagziel

    (BGU)

  • Yevgeny Tsodikovich

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • David Lagziel & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023. "Second Opinions and the Humility Threshold," Working Papers 2305, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2305
    as

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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/2305.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Kaae Jensen, 2018. "Distributional Comparative Statics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 581-610.
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    3. Elchanan Mossel & Manuel Mueller‐Frank & Allan Sly & Omer Tamuz, 2020. "Social Learning Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1235-1267, May.
    4. Senthil K. Veeraraghavan & Laurens G. Debo, 2011. "Herding in Queues with Waiting Costs: Rationality and Regret," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 329-346, July.
    5. S. Ali & Navin Kartik, 2012. "Herding with collective preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 601-626, November.
    6. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir & Fershtman, Daniel & Rozen, Kareen, 2021. "On selecting the right agent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
    7. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2022. "Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 1-24, November.
    8. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
    9. Arieli, Itai, 2017. "Payoff externalities and social learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 392-410.
    10. Eyster, Erik & Galeotti, Andrea & Kartik, Navin & Rabin, Matthew, 2014. "Congested observational learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 519-538.
    11. Amil Dasgupta, 2000. "Social Learning with Payoff Complementarities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0322, Econometric Society.
    12. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    13. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-889, July.
    14. Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2021. "Sequential persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential Bayesian Games; Guided Equilibrium; Learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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