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Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Zenou, Yves & Xu, Jin & Zhou, Junjie, 2019. "Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 13647, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  3. Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018. "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers pme809, Job Market Papers.
  4. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021. "Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 178-198.
  5. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  6. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2022. "Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences," Papers 2206.09164, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  7. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
  8. Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2020. "Advertising and Voter Data in Asymmetric Political Contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
  9. Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017. "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 36-40.
  10. Dasgupta, Sulagna, 2024. "Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 5-16.
  11. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  12. Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020. "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  13. Juan Beccuti & Marc M ller, 2020. "Fighting for Lemons: The Encouragement Effect in Dynamic Contests with Private Information," Diskussionsschriften dp2017, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  14. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  15. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2021. "Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  16. Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  17. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
  18. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  19. Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 61-64.
  20. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
  21. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
  22. Lu, Jingfeng & Ma, Hongkun & Wang, Zhewei, 2023. "Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  23. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  24. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.
  25. Nikandrova, Arina & Pancs, Romans, 2017. "Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 174-212.
  26. Takashi Ui, 2020. "LQG Information Design," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 018, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  27. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
  28. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  29. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  30. Xin Feng, 2023. "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 401-421, June.
  31. Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana Sisak, 2022. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 529-580, February.
  32. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021. "Partial information disclosure in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  33. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  34. Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020. "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  35. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Feng, Xin, 2024. "Ambiguous persuasion in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 182-201.
  37. Chen, Bo & Chen, Bo, 2024. "Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 204-222.
  38. Xu, Jin & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2022. "Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  39. Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  40. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020. "Optimal Quality Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 161-176, June.
  41. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
  42. Raphaela Hennigs, 2019. "Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-16_1, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  43. Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023. "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 141-160.
  44. Raphael Boleslavsky & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2023. "Signaling With Commitment," Papers 2305.00777, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
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