Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion
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More about this item
Keywords
mediation; conflict; information design; Bayesian persuasion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2021-04-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-04-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2021-04-19 (Operations Research)
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