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The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure

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Cited by:

  1. Anna Khmelnitskaya & Özer Selçuk & Dolf Talman, 2020. "The average covering tree value for directed graph games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 315-333, February.
  2. Anna Khmelnitskaya & Peter Sudhölter, 2013. "The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 285-299, October.
  3. Huseynov, T. & Talman, A.J.J., 2012. "The Communication Tree Value for TU-games with Graph Communication," Other publications TiSEM 6ba97d87-1ac6-4af7-a981-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. Koshevoy, Gleb & Talman, Dolf, 2014. "Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 19-30.
  5. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
  6. René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman, 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 99-123, January.
  7. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2013. "A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2737-2748.
  8. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 157-178, February.
  9. Zijun Li & Fanyong Meng, 2023. "The α-Egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 97(3), pages 311-338, June.
  10. Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. & Sudhölter, Peter, 2011. "The prenucleolus for games with communication structures," Discussion Papers on Economics 10/2011, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
  11. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2015. "Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 159-165.
  12. Anna Khmelnitskaya & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman, 2016. "Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-070/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  13. Koshevoy, G.A. & Talman, A.J.J., 2011. "Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalitional Structure (Replaced by CentER DP 2011-119)," Discussion Paper 2011-025, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  14. Selçuk, Özer & Suzuki, Takamasa & Talman, Dolf, 2013. "Equivalence and axiomatization of solutions for cooperative games with circular communication structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 428-431.
  15. Liying Kang & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Erfang Shan & Dolf Talman & Guang Zhang, 2021. "The average tree value for hypergraph games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 94(3), pages 437-460, December.
  16. Nils Roehl, 2013. "Two-Stage Allocation Rules," Working Papers CIE 73, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
  17. René van den Brink, 2009. "Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-108/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  18. Mao, Liang, 2016. "The stability and efficiency of direct and star networks in a loan game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 53-60.
  19. Suzuki, T. & Talman, A.J.J., 2011. "Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Circular Communication Structure," Discussion Paper 2011-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  20. Alexander Mayer, 2018. "Luxembourg in the Early Days of the EEC: Null Player or Not?," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-12, May.
  21. Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 331-349, May.
  22. Liying Kang & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Erfang Shan & Dolf Talman & Guang Zhang, 2023. "The two-step average tree value for graph and hypergraph games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 323(1), pages 109-129, April.
  23. Albizuri, M. Josune & Sudhölter, Peter, 2014. "On the Core of Games with Communication Structures," Discussion Papers on Economics 6/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
  24. Baron, Richard & Béal, Sylvain & Remila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2008. "Average tree solutions for graph games," MPRA Paper 10189, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 818-849, May.
  26. Koshevoy, G.A. & Suzuki, T. & Talman, A.J.J., 2013. "Solutions For Games With General Coalitional Structure And Choice Sets," Other publications TiSEM a831011f-430e-4e82-b6f6-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. Özer Selçuk & Takamasa Suzuki, 2023. "Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 333-362, June.
  28. J. R. Fernández & I. Gallego & A. Jiménez-Losada & M. Ordóñez, 2019. "The cg-average tree value for games on cycle-free fuzzy communication structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(3), pages 456-478, October.
  29. Nils Roehl, 2013. "Two-Stage Allocation Rules," Working Papers Dissertations 01, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  30. Bahel, Eric, 2021. "Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  31. S. Ryuo & K. Sato & Y. Yamamoto, 2012. "Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 487-497, March.
  32. Napel, Stefan & Nohn, Andreas & Alonso-Meijide, José Maria, 2012. "Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 247-257.
  33. Roger A McCain, 2013. "Value Solutions in Cooperative Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 8528, August.
  34. M. Albizuri & Peter Sudhölter, 2016. "Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 451-475, February.
  35. Koshevoy, G.A. & Talman, A.J.J., 2011. "Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalitional Structure (Replaces CentER DP 2011-025)," Discussion Paper 2011-119, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  36. Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
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