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Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Miceli, Thomas J. & Stone, Michael P., 2014. "“Piggyback” lawsuits and deterrence: Can frivolous litigation improve welfare?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 49-57.
  2. Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
  3. Kyung Hwan Baik & In‐Gyu Kim, 2007. "Strategic Decisions On Lawyers’ Compensation In Civil Disputes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 854-863, October.
  4. Lambert Eve-Angéline & Chappe Nathalie, 2014. "Litigation with Legal Aid versus Litigation with Contingent/Conditional Fees," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 95-115, March.
  5. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  6. Sophie Bienenstock & Claudine Desrieux, 2022. "Abusive contract terms: Is unenforceability a deterrent sanction?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 187-216, October.
  7. Giuseppe Vita, 2012. "Normative complexity and the length of administrative disputes: evidence from Italian regions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 197-213, August.
  8. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
  9. Stone, Michael P. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2012. "Optimal attorney advertising," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 329-338.
  10. Gabuthy, Yannick & Peterle, Emmanuel & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2021. "Legal Fees, Cost-Shifting Rules and Litigation: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  11. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August.
  12. Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine, 2015. "To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 178-189.
  13. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.
  14. Deffains, Bruno & Doriat, Myriam, 1999. "The dynamics of pretrial negotiation in France:: Is there a deadline effect in the French legal system?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 447-470, December.
  15. Landeo, Claudia M. & Nikitin, Maxim, 2018. "Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 625-647.
  16. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
  17. Bradley Graham & Jack Robles, 2014. "Moral hazard and legal services contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 219-230, September.
  18. Claudia M. Landeo & Maxim Nikitin, 2006. "Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 571-600, December.
  19. Yun-chien Chang & Su-hao Tu, 2020. "Two-way selection between flat-fee attorneys and litigants: theoretical and empirical analyses," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 131-164, February.
  20. Baik Kyung Hwan, 2008. "Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 259-289, August.
  21. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
  22. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
  23. Gabuthy Yannick & Lambert Eve-Angéline, 2011. "English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 72-85, April.
  24. Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  25. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June.
  26. Amy Fanner & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
  27. Di Vita, Giuseppe, 2010. "Production of laws and delays in court decisions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 276-281, September.
  28. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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