Noisy talk

Citations

Cited by:

1. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
2. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo & Vila, José E., 2012. "Pragmatic languages with universal grammars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 738-752.
   • Penelope Hernandez & Amparo Urbano Salvador & Jose E. Vila, 2010. "Pragmatic Languages with Universal Grammars," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0110, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
3. de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
4. Sadowski, Philipp, 2016. "Overeagerness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 114-125.
5. Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014. "Dynamic strategic information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
   • Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
   • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
6. Oliver Board & Andreas Blume, 2008. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Paper 365, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Aug 2008.
7. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," THEMA Working Papers 2005-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Post-Print halshs-00754297, HAL.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754297, HAL.
   • Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
9. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
10. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
11. Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011. "Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
    • Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Discussion Paper 2010-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
12. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
13. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
14. Lightle, John P., 2013. "Harmful lie aversion and lie discovery in noisy expert advice games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 347-362.
15. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 33(4), pages 265-277, November.
    • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(16), pages 1.
    • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," Working Papers 0708, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    • Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," MPRA Paper 6465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2171, CESifo.
16. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    • Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
17. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
    • Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Economics Working Papers 1544, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
18. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
19. Kohei Kawamura, 2015. "Confidence and competence in communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 233-259, February.
20. Kohei, Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-43, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
21. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2022. "The art of brevity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 257-271.
    • Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2022. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113709, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
22. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
    • Hertel, Johanna & Smith, John, 2010. "Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication," MPRA Paper 23560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Hertel, Johanna & Smith, John, 2011. "Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication," MPRA Paper 29148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
23. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    • Kellner, Christian & Thordal-Le Quement, Mark, 2013. "Mode of ambiguous communication," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 10/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
24. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
25. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
26. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    • Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
27. Guembel, Alexander & Rossetto, Silvia, 2009. "Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 736-744, November.
    • Alexander Guembel & Silvia Rossetto, 2009. "Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding," Post-Print halshs-00491767, HAL.
28. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
29. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
30. Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
31. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
32. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
33. K.J.M. De Jaegher & R. van Rooij, 2011. "Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests," Working Papers 11-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
34. Hertel, Jo & Smith, John, 2009. "Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs," MPRA Paper 17056, University Library of Munich, Germany.
35. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2011. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
36. Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011. "Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
    • Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Discussion Paper 2010-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    • Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Other publications TiSEM 4b2421f3-f39c-4012-afef-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
37. Kohei Kawamura, 2013. "Confidence and Competence in Communication," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 222, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
38. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
39. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
40. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
41. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.