IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v131y2016ipap114-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Overeagerness

Author

Listed:
  • Sadowski, Philipp

Abstract

We capture the impression that high types may send lower signals than low types in order not to appear too desperate. We require a noisy one-dimensional signal, where a very low signal being transmitted forces types to execute their outside option. The central assumption is that low types are not only less productive when employed, but that they also face a worse outside option. High types then exploit low types’ eagerness not to end up with their bad outside option by running a larger risk of transmitting a very low signal.

Suggested Citation

  • Sadowski, Philipp, 2016. "Overeagerness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 114-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:114-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116301810
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.014?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    2. Bertrand, Marianne & Karlan, Dean S. & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Shafir, Eldar & Zinman, Jonathan, 2005. "What's Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market," Center Discussion Papers 28441, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    3. Andrew Weiss, 1995. "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 133-154, Fall.
    4. , & , J. & ,, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
    5. Aloisio Araujo & Daniel Gottlieb & Humberto Moreira, 2007. "A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 1020-1043, December.
    6. Clements, Matthew T., 2011. "Low quality as a signal of high quality," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 5, pages 1-22.
    7. Chung, Kim-Sau & Eső, Péter, 2013. "Persuasion and learning by countersignaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 487-491.
    8. Marianne Bertrand & Dean Karlan & Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir & Jonathan Zinman, 2010. "What's Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 263-306.
    9. Hans K. Hvide, 2003. "Education and the Allocation of Talent," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(4), pages 945-976, October.
    10. Teoh, Siew Hong & Hwang, Chuan Yang, 1991. "Nondisclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 283-313.
    11. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    12. Orzach, Ram & Tauman, Yair, 2005. "Strategic dropouts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 79-88, January.
    13. Daley, Brendan & Green, Brett, 2014. "Market signaling with grades," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 114-145.
    14. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
    15. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    2. Anna Boisits & Roland Königsgruber, 2016. "Information acquisition and disclosure by firms in the presence of additional available information," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.
    3. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
    4. Kim-Sau Chung & Peter Eso, 2007. "Signalling with Career Concerns," Discussion Papers 1443, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Chung, Kim-Sau & Eső, Péter, 2013. "Persuasion and learning by countersignaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 487-491.
    6. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
    7. Maté Fodor & Jean Luc De Meulemeester & Denis Rochat, 2019. "The Wavering Economic Thought About The Link Between Education And Growth," Working Papers CEB 19-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2020.
    9. Philipp Sadowski, 2011. "Overeagerness," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001198, David K. Levine.
    10. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    11. Dina Mayzlin & Jiwoong Shin, 2011. "Uninformative Advertising as an Invitation to Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 666-685, July.
    12. Damgaard, Mette Trier & Nielsen, Helena Skyt, 2018. "Nudging in education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 313-342.
    13. Anya Samek & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Selective Recognition: How to Recognize Donors to Increase Charitable Giving," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1489-1496, July.
    14. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    15. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
    16. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
    17. Lanz, Bruno & Wurlod, Jules-Daniel & Panzone, Luca & Swanson, Timothy, 2018. "The behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 190-205.
    18. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. David Clingingsmith & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2018. "Status and the demand for visible goods: experimental evidence on conspicuous consumption," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 877-904, December.
    20. Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023. "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 1-43, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:114-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.