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Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion

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Cited by:

  1. Sheldon, Ian & Roe, Brian & Olimov, Jafar, 2015. "“Regulation of Food Quality: Deep Capture and Economies of Scope between Innovation and Influence”," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 212255, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  2. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
  3. Brezis, Elise S., 2017. "Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 175-188.
  4. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Dongmin Kong & Junyi Xiang & Jian Zhang & Yiyang Lu, 2019. "Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1347-1383, March.
  6. Jacques Lawarrée & Dongsoo Shin, 2005. "Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(4), pages 621-635, December.
  7. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
  8. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
  9. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Does Regulatory Independence Translate into a Higher Degree of Liberalization? - Evidence from EU Energy Regulators," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-545, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  10. Jaesoo Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2023. "Vertical Relationships with Hidden Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-21, October.
  11. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  12. Cole, John A. & Cadogan, Godfrey, 2014. "Bankruptcy risk induced by career concerns of regulators," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 259-271.
  13. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  14. Silano, Filippo, 2022. "Revolving doors in government debt management," ILE Working Paper Series 61, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
  15. Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2014. "Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 82-106.
  16. Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2007. "Moonlighting: public service and private practice," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 1113-1133, December.
  17. Alketa Peci & Aline de Menezes Santos & Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo, 2022. "Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 470-486, April.
  18. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
  20. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2017. "A Theory of Soft Capture," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 571-596, July.
  21. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  22. Felgendreher, Simon & Lehmann, Paul, 2012. "The political economy of the peruvian urban water sector," UFZ Discussion Papers 18/2012, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
  23. Cornaggia, Jess & Cornaggia, Kimberly J. & Xia, Han, 2016. "Revolving doors on Wall Street," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 400-419.
  24. Rhee, Keeyoung & Hwang, Sunjoo, 2019. "Effects of Revolving Doors in the Financial Sector: Evidence from Korea," KDI Focus 94, Korea Development Institute (KDI).
  25. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  26. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
  27. De Meio Reggiani, Martin C. & Vazquez, Miguel & Hallack, Michelle & Brignole, Nélida B., 2019. "The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  28. Yuval Feldman & Eliran Halali, 2019. "Regulating “Good” People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 65-83, January.
  29. Sounman Hong & Jeehun Lim, 2016. "Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 69-86, January.
  30. Luzuriaga, María José, 2023. "Health system privatization, the pandemic and deprivatization under discussion," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), April.
  31. Haiyuan Yin & Baifan Chen, 2021. "Hometown identity of financial officials, financial development and promotion of officials in China," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 520-543, September.
  32. Li Chen & Shiqing Yao & Kaijie Zhu, 2020. "Responsible Sourcing Under Supplier-Auditor Collusion," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 1234-1250, November.
  33. Zhang, Karen & Truong, Cameron, 2019. "What’s the value of politically connected directors?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
  34. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2007. "Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils," CESifo Working Paper Series 1993, CESifo.
  35. Incerti, Trevor, 2024. "Who benefits from the revolving door? Evidence from Japan," OSF Preprints cmt7j, Center for Open Science.
  36. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
  37. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  39. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
  40. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  41. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2012. "Rethinking Regulatory Capture," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  42. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2012. "What Do Revolving-Door Laws Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 421-436.
  43. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  44. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
  45. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
  46. Grace, Martin F. & Phillips, Richard D., 2008. "Regulator performance, regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 116-133, January.
  47. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  48. deHaan, Ed & Kedia, Simi & Koh, Kevin & Rajgopal, Shivaram, 2015. "The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 65-96.
  49. Jonas Heese, 2022. "Does Industry Employment of Active Regulators Weaken Oversight?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9198-9218, December.
  50. Matsusaka, John G., 2018. "Special Interest Influence under Direct versus Representative Democracy," Working Papers 278, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  51. Duncan Thomas K. & Coyne Christopher J., 2015. "The Revolving Door and the Entrenchment of the Permanent War Economy," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(3), pages 391-413, August.
  52. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
  53. Brian Meehan & Bruce Benson, 2015. "The occupations of regulators influence occupational regulation: evidence from the US private security industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 97-117, January.
  54. Lin, Jing & Ma, Xin & Talluri, Srinivas & Yang, Cheng-Hu, 2021. "Retail channel management decisions under collusion," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(2), pages 700-710.
  55. Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2013. "Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator’s Objective," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 563-594, August.
  56. Majumdar, Mukul & Yoo, Seung Han, 2011. "Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling," Working Papers 11-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  57. Dongsoo Shin, 2007. "Contracts under Wage Compression: A Case of Beneficial Collusion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, July.
  58. Michael M. Ting, 2017. "Politics and Administration," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 305-319, April.
  59. Barbosa, Klenio & Straub, Stéphane, 2017. "The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement," TSE Working Papers 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2020.
  60. Mukund Chari & H. Kevin Steensma & Charles Connaughton, 2020. "Previous and Prospective Career Mobility, Client Capture, and Compromised Professional Judgment: The Withholding of Known Relevant Prior Art by Patent Lawyers on Behalf of Their Clients," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 489-507, March.
  61. Guthrie, Graeme, 2020. "Regulation, welfare, and the risk of asset stranding," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 273-287.
  62. Mukul Majumdar & Seung Yoo, 2012. "Strategic analysis of influence peddling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 737-762, November.
  63. Christopher J. Coyne & Courtney Michaluk & Rachel Reese, 2016. "Unproductive entrepreneurship in US military contracting," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 221-239, August.
  64. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  65. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joel Shapiro, 2011. "Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 120-124, May.
  66. Silano, Filippo, 2022. "The effectiveness of revolving door laws: Evidence from government debt management," ILE Working Paper Series 63, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
  67. Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2001. "Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 573-596, March.
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