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The Revolving Door and the Entrenchment of the Permanent War Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Duncan Thomas K.

    (Department of Economics, Radford University, P.O. Box 6952, Radford, VA 24142, USA)

  • Coyne Christopher J.

    (Department of Economics, George Mason University, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the “revolving door” phenomena in the military sector in the US. The revolving door refers to the back-and-forth movement of personnel between the government and private sector. We examine the structure of the revolving door and explain how its very nature leads to the perpetuation of the permanent war economy. This analysis yields several important implications. First, the dynamics of the revolving door shape the military-industrial complex in a way that serves the narrow interests of select elites rather than the broad interests of citizens. Second, because the perverse incentives are a product of the institutional structure of the US military sector, the negative consequences are also structural and cannot be solved by increased oversight.

Suggested Citation

  • Duncan Thomas K. & Coyne Christopher J., 2015. "The Revolving Door and the Entrenchment of the Permanent War Economy," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(3), pages 391-413, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:21:y:2015:i:3:p:391-413:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2015-0001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher J. Coyne & Amy Crockett, 2023. "A Conflict of Peace Visions: The Peacemonger Mentality vs. the Warmonger Mentality," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(Fall 2023), pages 1-24.
    2. Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Institutions and Armed Forces," Springer Books, in: Defense Economics, chapter 0, pages 23-65, Springer.
    3. Christopher J. Coyne & Courtney Michaluk & Rachel Reese, 2016. "Unproductive entrepreneurship in US military contracting," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 221-239, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; military-industrial complex; national defense; revolving door; permanent war economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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